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In the European Union, the water policy is mainly driven by the Water Framework Directive
(WFD) of 2000. One of its main targets is to work toward an environmental quality illustrating
the best trade-oﬀ between economic and ecological interests. One consequence is that member
states look for economic instruments allowing to reach a pre-deﬁned standard of water pollution at
least cost. Wetlands play a crucial and growing role since they can constitute one of the cheapest
means to be used, in combination with classical regulation instruments like charges on polluting
inputs, in order to achieve environmental quality standards. For instance, in Sweden, one of the
measures implemented by the Government to reduce the excessive nutrient that contributes to the
eutrophication of the Baltic Sea was the establishment and restoration of wetlands.1
The point of departure of our paper is that the least cost means of improving water quality can
involve the use of wetlands. But what are the implications in terms of water pollution regulation?
The WFD also promotes the extensive use of economic incentives like input charges. This means
that governments have to combine economic instruments consisting in giving incentives to reduce
the use of polluting inputs and wetlands restoration. What will be the eﬀect of using wetlands on
the input charge and on the farmers’ abatement eﬀort? This is the main question that we want to
investigate in this work. In order to answer, we propose to build a model underlying the main forces
that are at work. We will keep this model as simple as possible in order to be able to illustrate it
by using some "real" data in a joint eﬀort with scientists from other disciplines.
We will present our model in section 2. In section 3, we will study the benchmark case in which
the regulator does not construct an AW in order to reduce pollution. Section 4 will be devoted
to the case in which it is constructed. In section 5, we will compare the two cases in order to
investigate the implications on the charge thath a st ob ei m p l e m e n t e dw i t h i ns u c haf r a m e w o r k ,
and thus on the eﬀort of pollution abatement asked to the farmer. Finally, in section 6, we will
develop a numerical illustration applied to a wine catchment area located in North-East of France.
We will conclude this work in section 7.
2. The model
We consider a ﬁxed number  of farmers and a regulator. The regulator wants to reduce pollution
from pesticides used by farmers in order to reach a water quality target. We assume that there are
two possible ways of reducing pollution:
• on the one hand, the farmers are supposed to be able to reduce the amount of pesticides used
if the regulator gives them some economic incentives,
• on the other hand, the regulator can construct an AW that is able to remove pesticides
molecules from water.
1See Gren, Elofsson and Jannke (1997), for instance. denotes the amount of pesticides used by the farmer  ( =1 ).  := ¯ − is the pesticide
use reduction operated by the farmer with respect to the one corresponding to one optimal running,
. The pesticides use reduction  has a cost2, (),w h i c hr e ﬂects the change in the farmer’s 
proﬁts resulting from this reduction. This cost is assumed to increase with the amount of pesticides
removed, at an increasing rate (it is convex):   0 and   0.3 Furthermore, no reduction
induces no cost, (0) = 0; small reductions are not very costly, lim
→0
 =0 ; but large ones
are disheartening, lim
→−
 =+ ∞.  → 0 means that the amount of pesticides used is at its
maximum, ,a n d →  −  that it is at its minimum one, .
We also assume that the mass of pollutant in water, , is proportional to the total amount
of pesticides used:  :=  where  :=
P
=1  is the global amount of pesticides used at the
catchment level and  ∈ [01] is the transfer coeﬃcient of the pesticides used into the water; 1−
is usually called the natural assimilative capacity.
The regulator is assumed to own the land located downstream with respect to the farmers’
ﬁelds. As a consequence, it can decide to construct on these lands an AW of size , in order to
eliminate some pesticides contained in water. We assume that the suitable land area that can be
converted into an AW is such that the size can not be higher than , since the regulator does not
hold inﬁnite property rights on lands. The construction of an AW has a cost that is assumed to
depend on the size converted: (). It is increasing,   0, and convex,   0,a n dt h e r ei sn o
cost when no AW is constructed: (0) = 0. Furthermore, small constructions are not very costly,
lim
→0
 =0 , but large ones are disheartening, lim
→
 =+ ∞.
Concerning the physical process behind the reduction of the pollution with pesticides thanks to
the construction of the AW, we are going to assume that the quantity, , of pesticides assimilated
by an AW of size , depends both on the total mass of pesticides in water at the exit of the AW,
,a n do nt h i ss i z e : := (). We expect that  is increasing with the size of the AW (at
a decreasing rate:   0) and also with the mass of pollutant ( and   0).  can be
interpreted as the eﬃciency of a pre-determined AW with respect to the pesticides assimilation; it
is positive and we assume that the mass of pesticides assimilated by the AW increases less than one
unit when the mass of pesticides entering into it increases in one unit: 1    0.N om o l e c u l e
of pesticides induces no assimilation and neither does no AW construction: (0)=(0) = 0.
The total size of AW available, ¯ , is assumed so high that, next to this point, each additional unit
of AW becomes ineﬃcient, lim
→
 =0∀0, and when no AW is constructed, the eﬃciency of
constructing the ﬁrst unit is assumed strictly positive, lim
→0
  0 ∀0.4
To sum up,
• when the AW is not constructed, the mass of pesticide in water is proportional to the quantity
2In order to keep the model easily tractable for a ﬁrst numerical illustration, this cost function is assumed to be
t h es a m eo n ef o ra l lf a r m e r s .
3Subscripts of functions indicate partial derivatives.
4All these assumptions were approved by some soil experts, members of the LIFE Environment ARTWET project.
2applied by the farmers: ,
• and when it is constructed, the mass of pesticide in water is equal to the previous one minus
the assimilation of pesticides by the AW:  − ().
The targeted mass of pesticide is denoted . The pollution induced by the minimum mass
of pesticides use is assumed always lower than the targeted mass:    where  := .
Furthermore, the AW is assumed to be unable to assimilate the amount of pesticides corresponding
to the farmers’ maximum proﬁts up to the targeted mass:  − ()   ∀0 where
 := . As a consequence, the pollution induced by the maximum mass of pesticides use is always
higher than the targeted mass: .5 This assumption, combined with the symmetrical
one, is in phase with the WFD setting since the targeted mass, , is negotiated between farmers
and environmental protection associations. The assumption on the targeted mass without AW
construction also implies that:  − ()   ∀.
Remark 1. Our assumptions on () insures that the minimum of this function is reached at
 = .
Remark 1 tells us that when no regulation is implemented, the farmers aiming at minimizing the
costs of their pesticides use reduction will choose to use the amount of pesticides maximizing their
proﬁts. Since we assumed that , the targeted mass can not be reached without some
form of regulation of water pollution like a charge on pesticides used. Within our framework, it is
the regulator that will pursue this aim. In the benchmark case, this regulator will only implement
such a ﬁscal scheme. We will then consider another case in which an AW can be constructed in
order to reduce the mass of pesticides in water. In this latter case, since we assumed that the total
AW size can not be suﬃcient in order to reach the target ( − ()   ∀0), the
regulator will also have to implement a new ﬁscal scheme. We make these assumptions in order to
concentrate on the impact of an AW construction on the proportional ﬁscal scheme in more details.
From the best of our knowledge, no paper concentrates on this aspect.
3. The benchmark case: artiﬁcial wetlands are not constructed
In order to better underline the implications of AW construction, we propose to build a very
basic model consisting in three steps. But since these steps reﬂect a decision process, they can be
considered so closed in time that it is possible to ignore discounting eﬀects.
• In the ﬁrst step, the regulator chooses the proportional charge on pesticides use, ,t h a t
minimizes the sum of the farmers’ costs needed in order to achieve the targeted mass.
5This assumption doesn’t work for pesticides with very low adverse eﬀects in aquatic ecosystems where the
pollution corresponding to farmers’ maximum proﬁt could be below the targeted mass. A a consequence, our results
won’t ﬁt to such uncommon kind of pesticides.
3• In the second step, the farmers choose the amount of pesticides that minimizes their costs,
which then include the level of money levied through this proportional charge. In this work,
we don’t enter into the description of the decision process behind the pesticides use reduction.
• In the third step, the regulator balances its budget through transferring the amount of money
collected in the previous step as a lump-sum transfer back to the farmers who are assumed
myopic, i.e. they do not anticipate the exact value of this lump-sum transfer. We justify
the requirement of a balanced budget with respect to charge/lump sum payments for water
pollution by a "water pays water" principle. Furthermore, this will allow us to lead a complete
cost-eﬀectiveness analysis.
We are going to solve this model backward.
In the third step and once the targeted mass had been reached, the total amount of money
collected with the charge on pesticides use is redistributed, in an equal way, as a lump-sum transfer,
f  = 
 , to each farmer. The regulator is assumed to be a public agency that does not want to
make proﬁts; it is why it redistributes the money collected to the agents that we have in our model:
the farmers. We assume all along this paper that there are no regulation costs.
The lump-sum transfer could induce a strategic behavior of the farmers consisting in not re-
ducing the amount of pesticides used. But we assumed that they are myopic and thus unable to
anticipate the amount of the transfer, i.e. the lump-sum appears as a constant in the objective
function of the polluter. What about the European "polluter pays" principle? It is still at work
since even if the charge collected in order to reduce pesticides used is given back to the farmer, he
has to support the costs of reducing his pesticides use up to the level allowing to reach the target
.
In the second step,e a c hf a r m e rt a k e st h ec h a r g er a t ea sg i v e ns i n c ei ti sﬁxed by the regulator.
Furthermore, since the farmers are assumed myopic, they are unable to anticipate the exact value
of the lump-sum transfer. The program that each farmer solves is thus the basic following one:
min

(()) +  − f 
where ()= − .
Remark 2. The objective function is strictly convex since (− + ) =   0.
The solution ∗
 of this program, where the superscript ∗ denotes the solution of the benchmark
case, satisﬁes a classical ﬁrst order condition according to which marginal cost of abatement equal
the charge on pesticides:
∗
 =  (3.1)
4Lemma 3.1. (i) The total amount of pesticides used in the catchment area decreases with the
charge rate.
(ii) When the charge rate is zero, the amount of pesticides used in the catchment area is maximum
and when the charge is very high, it goes to its minimum.
It directly follows from this lemma that ∗() ∈ [].
Finally, in the ﬁrst step, the regulator chooses the proportional ﬁscal scheme  such that the
targeted mass is reached:
∗()=
We assumed that it has got a perfect and complete information but no proﬁts maximization ob-
jective. As a consequence, it is perfectly able to anticipate the best reply of the farmers to this
charge, ∗().
Furthermore, our assumptions on the targeted mass,   , insure that ∗() ∈
][ and the interiority of the charge rate, i.e. ∗ ∈]0+∞[, then directly comes from Lemma
3.1.





 denotes the marginal cost of removing one unit of pesticide from water.
(ii) The global amount of pesticides used in the catchment area is decreasing with the transfer
coeﬃcient of pesticides into water and increasing with the targeted mass.
(iii) The cost-eﬀective charge on pesticides is increasing with the transfer coeﬃcient and de-
creasing with the targeted mass.
We now turn to the study of the solution of the same problem in which we add the AW
construction.
4. The new condition of cost-eﬀectiveness when an artiﬁcial wetland is con-
structed
As we explained in the introduction, there is some empirical evidence in favour of the construction
of AW in order to clean up water from the pesticides that it contains. When the regulator is
taken this possibility into account, it is mainly the ﬁrst and the third steps of the model previously
studied that are changed. As before, the model is going to be solved backward.
In the third step, as in the previous case, a lump-sum transfer is redistributed to the farmers.
It now includes the AW construction costs and becomes the following one: c  =
−()
 .W i t h
such a formulation, the AW construction costs are supported by the farmers; the "polluter pays"
principle is thus checked and, contrary to the benchmark case, the lump-sum transfer can either
be positive or negative, according to the size of the AW.
5In the second step, the objective function of each farmer is the same one as when the regulator
does not construct an AW except that the lump-sum transfer has got a quite diﬀerent value. But
this has no eﬀect on the marginal values and the solution shares the same properties as in the case
where the AW is not constructed.
In the ﬁrst step, the regulator chooses the proportional charge on pesticides, , that minimizes
the costs needed in order to achieve the targeted mass, i.e. the sum of the costs of reducing the
amount of pesticides used and of AW construction. We remind here that we assumed that AW
construction can only be implemented by the regulator. The optimization program to be solved by






 ()) + ()





where ~() shares the same properties as ∗() and the superscript ~ denotes the solution of
the model with AW construction.
Proposition 4.1. When the regulator considers the possibility of constructing an AW in order to
reduce the mass of pesticides in water, the solution of the model,
¡
~~ ~~¢
, is such that the
marginal cost of removing one unit of pesticide from water located after the AW is the same one if














We now want to investigate the implications of the regulator construction of AW in order to
clean up the water pollution with pesticides.
5. The implications of constructing an artiﬁcial wetland
We are going to compare the results obtained in both the versions of our model (denoted by the
superscripts ∗ and ~).
First of all, if the targeted mass is reached in both cases, the eﬀort asked to the farmer in order
to do so is quite diﬀerent. Indeed, since we showed that ~ ∈][ and ~ ∈]0 ¯ [,w ek n o wf r o m
our assumptions that ~  0. It directly follows that the total amount of pesticides used by the
farmers in the benchmark case is lower than the one occurring when the regulator constructs an
AW:









As a consequence, AW construction reduces the total eﬀort ∆ :=
P
=1  that is asked to the










6What about the cost-eﬀectiveness of reaching the targeted mass thanks to AW construction if
some interiority assumptions (ensuring that  6=0 ) are relaxed? Up to this point, it seems that,
when all farmers are assumed identical ( = ∀), the construction of an AW by the regulator
generates a gain, Γ := (∗) − 
¡
~¢
, which accrues to the farmers since the use of a higher
amount of pesticides reduces the cost, , of the deviation from the point maximizing their proﬁts,
:
  0 and ∗   ~ ⇒ (∗)  
¡
~¢
and Γ  0
But in order to fully compare the cost-eﬀectiveness of the two cases, we also have to enter into
the picture the global ﬁscal scheme (the proportional charge, , but also the lump-sum transfer, )
implemented by the regulator. As a consequence, we compare the global cost function of the farmers




for the case with AW since the ﬁscal schemes are respectively (∗ f ) and (~ c ). According
to the diﬀerence between the gains accruing to the farmers thanks to an AW construction and the
costs induced, we can distinguish between two cases:
(i) if Γ  (~), constructing an AW in addition to a ﬁscal scheme is more cost-eﬀective
than not,
(ii) if Γ  (~), constructing an AW is not cost-eﬀective.
Finally, we can simply deduce from   0 and (∗) 
¡
~¢
a property of the charge levied
on each unit of pesticides used according to which it is higher in the benchmark case than in the
case with AW construction:
∗  ~
Proposition 5.1. The proportional charge that has to be implemented in order to reduce pollution
with pesticides to the targeted mass is lower than if no AW had been constructed: ∗  ~.W h e n
the AW is constructed, the total eﬀort that is asked to the farmers in order to reach the targeted
mass in water is reduced: ∆∗  ∆~.
This result can seem quite uncommon since when AW are constructed, the farmer is allowed
to pollute more, i.e. this type of water pollution regulation increases the amount of pesticides use
allowed. But the reader must keep in mind that the targeted mass is still reached. Furthermore,
if we now imagine that no ﬁscal scheme is implemented, we know from our assumptions that the
farmer will use the maximum amount of pesticides, , and that the targeted mass won’t be reached,
neither in the case without AW, nor in the one with it. Nevertheless it remains that AW allows to
reduce the ambient amount of pesticides contained in water since we have:





As a consequence, our results abet the possibility of more stringent water quality when AW can be
constructed by the regulator.
76. A numerical illustration: a wine catchment area in Rouﬀach (North-East of
France)
To illustrate the theoretical model, we further propose a numerical illustration. For this illustration,
we focus on fungicide pollution from viticulture. For the ease of exposition we propose to name
the assimilation of pesticides by the AW the "downstream treatment" and the abatement by the
farmers the "upstream treatment".
6.1. Downstream treatment
In the framework of the LIFE Environment ARTWET project, Grégoire (Grégoire et al., 2009) and
Imfeld (Imfeld et al., 2009) completed some experiments in a small catchment in Alsace (France)
to simulate the credibility of an AW for removing pesticides from water.
In this catchment of 289 ,a b o u t20  of fungicides are applied upstream by 28 wine-
growers each year, and each year about 20  streams to the AW after rain events. The residues are
assimilated or stocked upstream, and a part can be found on the groundwater in the long term. In
this illustration we are only interested in the short term eﬀect namely the fungicides that reach the
AW.
In the theoretical model the treatment rises when the size  of the AW increases. Here, this
eﬀect is reproduced by increasing the size of the gravel ﬁlter. Increasing the gravel ﬁlter causes
an increase of the hydraulic retention time and, therefore the removal of pesticides. Nevertheless,
above a certain threshold, increasing the gravel ﬁlter more is useless.
From the observation of 12 rain events from April 2009 to July 2009, we have estimated the
treatment function  a c c o r d i n gt ot h ev o l u m eo ft h eﬁlter  and the mass of pollutant  as
following:




The functional form selected ﬁt to the main assumptions of the theoretical model since:  =
10−4 (−09 + 126) and  =1 0 −4 ¡
−0452 + 126
¢
. We have calibrated the natural assim-
ilative capacity (without AW) as  =6 10−3.
The gravel ﬁlter consists in quaternary gravels from the local Alsatian quaternary ﬂoodplain
and a gabion barrier in front of the ﬁlter to block the gravel mass. We used data provided by the
LIFE Environment ARTWET project: the gabion barrier has a unit cost of 5000  and the price
of the gravel is about 15  per 3:6
()=1 5  + 5000
6.2. Upstream treatment
Leroy and Soler, within the Framework of a French project (see Bazoche et al., 2009), estimated
the reduction of the mean yield when the wine-growers use less fungicides. In calibrating this
6Let us remind that we assumed that the regulator already owns lands bordering some farmers’ ﬁelds.
8information with economic data of this catchment, we estimated the following function:
()=0 02242
 +2 
with:  =0 0224 +2 .
The abatement cost is estimated as an opportunity cost (proﬁt loss) when the fungicides used
decreases. In such a case, a part of the production is lost, because of diseases increase.
6.3. Results of the simulations
First, the reader certainly noticed that all our theoretical assumptions are not exactly checked,
specially the one ensuring the uniqueness of the solution. We obtained a unique solution by not
considering solutions with a complex part.
Without any regulation, the maximum quantity of fungicides spread upstream, ¯ ,i se q u a lt o
24620 g.
One per 1000 reaches the AW zone, which treats again 40% of pesticides when there is no AW
( =0 ). Then with  =2 4 620 and  =0 ,i tr e m a i n s14769 mg of fungicides in the downstream
of the AW.
If we want to divide this mass of pesticides by 10 without increasing ,w eh a v et or e d u c e
from 24620 gt o2462 g. The total abatement cost is then 436929  and the charge rate is 374
 by gram.
Nevertheless another solution would consist in a combination of upstream and downstream
eﬀort. By this way, we can reach the same target of 14769 mg with a total cost of 25885  in
increasing  to 13988 (downstream cost ()=7 098 ) and reducing  to 20860 g (upstream
cost (∆)=1 8 786 ). The charge rate for the farmers is 8  by gram of fungicides rejected and
the diﬀerence between the charge paid and the cost of the AW construction, ,i s159937 .
Then, with the AW the percentage reduction of the total cost is 94%, and the reduction of the
charge rate is about 785%.
A sensibility study around this target, gave us the following Figure 1.
We can see on Figure 1 that the savings with the AW are very important. The magnitude of
these savings seems to depend on the target.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed to consider an original method of water pollution with pesticides abate-
ment: AW construction. The assimilative capacity of an AW diﬀers here from the basic natural
one by the fact that it strongly depends on the size of the ﬁl t e rt h a tc a nb ea d j u s t e db yt h er e g u -
lator with a limited amount of land. The main diﬀerence of our paper with respect to the existing
literature is that we studied the impact of considering AW construction on the ﬁscal scheme imple-
mented by a regulator in order to reduce water pollution with pesticides to a targeted mass. We








Figure 6.1: Savings with AW construction
also studied its impact on the eﬀort that is asked to a farmer in order to reduce pesticides found
in water bodies.
More particularly, we showed that the consideration of AW construction in order to reach a
pre-determined targeted mass of pollution in water can reduce both the eﬀort that is asked to the
farmers and the charge on pesticides that has to be implemented. We checked this theoretical result
on a numerical example. It remains true as long as the costs of constructing an AW are lower than
the gains accruing to the farmers thanks to the AW construction. As a consequence, our framework
is able to take into account the trade-oﬀs that can occur between diﬀerent land-uses.
Policy implications are of two natures. Firstly, our results abets the possibility for more stringent
water quality standards at the national level since regulators can construct AW in order to reduce
the amount of pesticides contained in water. Secondly, we know that in the real life input charges
are below their optimal level for lobbying reasons. When considering the possibility of constructing
an AW in addition to classical regulation tools such as environmental taxation, our results show
that the input charge implemented in practice by policy-makers could come closer to the optimal
input charge needed in such a situation.
Our model is so generic that it could be applied to any measure with a similar assimilative ca-
pacity and cost function. And as a consequence such a measure would result in the same conclusion
with regards to eﬃciency of the input charge under its presence.
Nevertheless, this work contains some limits. Firstly, we need to investigate empirically the
costs functions in order to lead a more robust empirical analysis and, in the line of Shibata and
Winrich (1983), to see how results could be changed according to the assumptions made on this
function. But in order to carry out a careful econometric analysis, we need more data related to the
wine-growers production function and to the AW costs. Secondly, we did not enter into the picture
the fact that AW can provide a lot of other services, in particular ecological one. Considering
them induces that AW construction can even more be of major importance, assuming that these
services are higher than the one induced by an input charge that would also have to be taken into
account within such a framework. Indeed, the beneﬁts induced by an input charge must include
10the eﬀect on health of pesticide use reduction in agricultural production. But in the real world,
the ecological services of wetlands and the eﬀects of pesticides use reduction on health are very
diﬃcult to evaluate and, from the best of our knowledge, no economic work concentrates on the
AW services. It is why we limited our work to a cost eﬀectiveness framework. Finally, it would
be of interest to include some dynamic eﬀects in the assimilation process of wetlands. But such
an extension needs a strong help of scientists of other disciplines and it is why it is left for future
works.
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